Abstract We consider two models for stochastic equilibrium: one based on the variational equilibrium of a generalized Nash game, and the other on the mixed complementarity formulation. The models differ in how the agents interpret their own actions on the market. An important characteristic of our approach is that the agents hedge risk in the objective functions (on costs or profits) of their optimization problems, which has a clear economic interpretation. This feature is obviously desirable, but in the risk-averse case it leads to variational inequalities with set-valued operators -a class of problems for which no established software is currently available. To overcome this difficulty, we approximate the problem by a sequence of differentiable variational inequalities based on smoothing the nonsmooth risk measure (such as average (conditional) value-at-risk) in the agents' problems. The resulting problems can be tackled by the PATH solver, for example. Convergence of this approximation scheme is established. Finally, numerical results on a part of the real-life European gas network are presented, including the use of Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition in conjunction with the smoothing approach.
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Introduction
Over the last three decades and in a worlwide trend, many industries that were considered as "natural monopolies" in the 1970s (electricity, telecommunications, natural gas, water supply) were restructured to introduce competition into one or more of their horizontal segments. Nevertheless, even in the most liberalizing countries, some strategical sectors continue to be subject to regulations in quality, price and entry. Such is the case for networks transmitting and distributing electricity or transporting natural gas. For these oligopolistic industries, the regulatory mechanisms have important implications not only for supporting wholesale and retail competition but also to maintain the network reliability. To have a full understanding of the market behaviour, it is necessary to understand the impact of distortions introduced by the regulator when capping prices, or when applying rewards and incentives for efficient production, like the emission allowance allocation system in [44] .
In this work we consider equilibrium problems for a market with competing risk-averse agents that try to maximize profit subject to coupling constraints resulting from regulatory interventions or market clearing conditions. Among related literature, however mostly casting the problem in deterministic or risk-neutral settings, we mention [6] , [21] , [1] , [33] (and its companion paper [34] ), [37] , [22] , [11] , [5] , [43] . In this work, we adopt the twostage modeling of [28] . Our approach is comprehensive enough to include the electricity generation-capacity expansion model [12] and the European natural gas market model in [17] , set in a stochastic environment.
As well explained in [32] , these type of problems combine the paradigms of competition, dynamics and hierarchy. And as such, they require the interplay of various areas, like optimization, game theory, mixed complementarity problems (MCP), and variational inequalities (VI). For example, VIs can be employed for capturing certain solutions of convex Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEP). Specifically, for GNEPs the VI formulation amounts to finding a Variational Equilibrium, which is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium that privileges points that lead to equal marginal values for all the players in the game; see [13] and also [24, 25] .
In the presence of uncertainty, VIs give rise to numerous challenges already in the riskneutral case. To start with and as briefly discussed below, where and how to introduce uncertainty and risk in a tractable/convenient way is already not a straightforward matter and a number of different approaches have been considered. Existence of solutions in the stochastic case is also a more complex issue. Some existence results for the class of VIs arising from convex Nash games with shared constraints are given in [38] for risk-neutral players and in [28, Proposition 6] for risk-averse players. Stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints are analyzed in [35, 41, 27] .
In this paper we focus on how to compute stochastic equilibrium prices for a market with risk-averse agents. As already mentioned, one important issue in this respect is how to handle uncertainty in a VI. How to endow a VI with risk aversion in an economically meaningful and computationally tractable manner is a further challenge.
Recall that given a mapping F and a closed convex set C, the usual (with a single-valued F) variational inequality [14] is stated as VI (F,C) : findx ∈ C such that F(x), x −x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ C .
In a stochastic environment, e.g., when the operator and/or the feasible set depend on stochastic parameters, say ξ , deciding what is a "good" VI formulation is not straightforward and may depend on a specific application. Suppose for the moment that there is no risk aversion, the feasible set is deterministic, and let ξ (ω) be a random vector for ω defined in a probability space (Ω , F, P). Let E denote the expected value function.
-One possibility, explored in [18] , is to consider the variational problem VI E F(·; ω) ,C : findx ∈ C such that E F(x, ω) , x −x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ C .
In this approach, if the feasible set C is also stochastic, the normal cone enters the expectation function, yielding the problem VI E(F(·; ω) + N C ω (·)), R n ,
where we assume that x ∈ R n . -Another possiblity, explored in [3] , is to minimize the expected value of the D-gap function [30, 36, 42, 14] associated to the stochastic VI, i.e., find a (global) solution to the problem min E(g ω (x)), x ∈ R n , where the nonnegative D-gap function g · (·) satisfies g ω (x) = 0 ⇐⇒ 0 ∈ F(x; ω) + N C ω (x) a.e. ω ∈ Ω .
Note that minimizing E(g ω (·)) is not equivalent to solving the VI associated to E(F(·; ω)), even if a global minimizer is found (computable gap functions are usually nonconvex). The above approaches are only two examples; there are other ways of handling uncertainty in VIs, all somehow different (for example, employing other merit functions).
In the presence of risk aversion, the situation is even more complex. First, proceeding by analogy with the above and replacing the expectation E by some risk measure ρ [7] , one could consider solving the problems VI ρ F(·; ω) ,C or (globally) min ρ(g ω (·)) .
However, this approach has some drawbacks, at least for our problems of interest described in detail below. In our setting, the VI under consideration comes from writing an equilibrium problem for a market with N agents trying to optimize their activities. In a deterministic environment the VI operator has components of the form F i (x) = ∇ x i f i (x), i = 1, . . . , N, for certain objective functions f i and subvectors x i representing the actions of each agent. Consider the stochastic case with f i = f i (x; ω) and agents exhibiting possibly different degrees of risk aversion (the measure ρ i varies with each agent i). Then the VI operator in (1) is given by
The reason why the associated VI is not satisfactory is that it hedges risk on the derivatives of the cost functions of the agents, instead of on the costs themselves. In our context, such an approach appears hard to interpret. It is clear that minimizing the gap function in (1) suffers from a similar issue.
As we do know the origin of our stochastic VI, we exploit this knowledge and endow with risk aversion the optimization problems of the agents. This leads us to consider solution methods for VIs with operators of the form
which has a clear economic interpretation (it hedges risk on the cost functions). It should be commented here that (2) and (3) are the same in the risk-neutral case of ρ = E, but not in the risk-averse case. Also, in the risk-averse case ρ is generally nondifferentiable. The desirable fomulation (3) gives rise to some numerical issues that have to be dealt with. For nonsmooth risk measures like the widely used conditional or average value-atrisk (AVaR [39] ), we obtain VIs with set-valued operators F. Currently, there appears to be no established efficient software available for VIs of this class (in cases not equivalent to nonsmooth optimization). For this reason, we build a family of approximating VIs with single-valued operators, comprised by gradients of functions obtained from smoothing the AVaR . The smoothed functions are also risk measures but, unlike the AVaR , they are not coherent. We establish the validity and convergence of the resulting approximation scheme for two stochastic models of market equilibrium: based on the GNEP and on the MCP approaches. The smooth approximating problems are solved by the PATH solver [8, 15] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our setting: the two-stage approach to handling uncertainty, risk aversion, and the GNEP and MCP models of the market. Section 3 describes our solution method based on random samples and the variational formulation of the two models. An approximation scheme for the resulting VIs with set-valued operators obtained via smoothing the nondifferentiable risk measures, and its convergence, are presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides numerical results on a part of the real-life European gas network. In particular, the effects or risk aversion, smoothing, and other issues are investigated. In addition, the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition [16, 29] of variational inequalities is employed to speed up solution times.
Our notation is mostly standard. The inner product (in an arbitrary space) is denoted by ·, · , and the notation u ⊥ v means that u, v = 0. The nonnegative orthant in R l is denoted by R l + . For a convex function ψ, its subdifferential at a point u is the set ∂ ψ(u) = {w : ψ(v) ≥ ψ(u) + w, v − u for all v}; for a convex function of two variables like ψ(u, v), ∂ u ψ stands for the subdifferential mapping of ψ with respect to the variable u. For a vector u, the notation (u i ,ū −i ) means that the second block of components of u is fixed in the given context. For a convex set U, its normal cone at the point u is the set N U (u) = {w : w, v − u ≤ 0 for all v ∈ U} if u ∈ U and the empty set otherwise. We sometimes use the alternative (equivalent) formulation of a normal cone, as the subdifferential of the indicator function i U of the set U, which is zero for u ∈ U and +∞ otherwise. Finally, for a set-valued mapping Ψ and a closed convex set U, the associated VI is the following problem:
Modelling Equilibrium Problems in the Presence of Risk Aversion
We consider two different models for stochastic equilibrium, one based on game theory and the other on the complementarity formulation. For the natural gas market, the deterministic MCP model from [10] and [17] was revisited in a stochastic risk-neutral setting in [9] . For electricity markets, game-theoretical and MCP formulations have been considered in [26] and [12] , respectively. Regarding the respective merits of the two modelling approaches, it is sometimes argued that the MCP formulation provides an adequate framework for imperfect markets. Nevertheless, at least in a deterministic environment, it is shown in [29] that equivalent equilibria can be obtained by GNEP and by MCP; more details are given in Remark 1 below. Since the two models are eventually casted in this paper as related stochastic VIs, we carry on our theoretical development for both of them in parallel.
General Setting
We analyze the equilibrium of a market regulated by coupling constraints or by a price cap, with risk-averse agents trying to maximize profit in an uncertain environment. Specifically, in our model the stochastic agents' problems are set in a two-stage framework. For agents i = 1, . . . , N, we consider -"investment" variables z i of the "here-and-now" type, to be decided before the uncertainty realizes; and -"generation" variables q i of the type "wait-and-see", decided at a second stage, once realization of the random vector ξ (ω) for ω in the sample space Ω becomes known. Given a probability space defined by a measure P on Ω , equipped with a sigma-algebra F, the second-stage decision variables for the ith agent are random functions in the spaces L p (Ω , F, P) for p ∈ [1, +∞), defined for i = 1, . . . , N. Equilibrium prices belong to the dual space L p * (Ω , F, P) with 1/p + 1/p * = 1.
For each realization ω ∈ Ω , the ith agent decisions to invest and produce depend on available resources and technology, represented by feasible sets X i ω , endogenous to each agent. The actions of the other agents, represented by the variablesz −i andq −i (ω) below, have an impact on the ith agent's remuneration. Finally, each operational decision of the agent involves an investment cost I i (z) and (random) production costs c i ω (q), which induces the total cost:
After transformation of the product, transportation losses, etc, the amount h i ω (q i (ω)) is delivered to the client and the agent is remunerated at a unit price π(ω). So the random revenue of the ith agent is
The remuneration price π(ω) is considered exogenous for most of the agents, except for those agents large enough to exert market power, see Remark 1 below. This price is a Lagrange multiplier of some constraint coupling the agents' actions in the market, for example a market clearing condition requiring that supply meets demand. We assume these coupling constraints involve random affine functions h i ω depending only on second stage variables and write them in the abstract form
which will have the associated Lagrange multiplier denoted by π(ω) ∈ R m 0 .
Two Equilibrium Models with Risk Aversion
The market equilibrium will be given by a primal-dual point of the form
representing operational decisions of the agents and equilibrium prices, respectively. The concept of equilibrium depends on two important issues:
1. how each agent hedges risk, and 2. how the agents interpret their own actions on the market.
Regarding the first item, we model the ith agent aversion to volatility by a monotone convex risk measure ρ i (·), assumed to be a proper function, see [7, Chap.6] . For a random outcome Y ∈ L 1 (Ω , F, P) representing a loss and a given confidence level 1 − ε ∈ (0, 1), an important example (that is a coherent risk measure) is the well-known average value-at-risk introduced in [39] as conditional value-at-risk:
Here E(·) stands for the expected-value function taken with respect to dP, and [·] + := max{0, ·} denotes the positive-part function. To model the realistic world of the agents having different degrees of risk aversion, we consider the functions
for a given risk-aversion parameter κ i ∈ [0, 1]. An observation relevant for the subsequent computational developments is that, because of the positive-part function involved in the AVaR, the measures (5) are nondifferentiable whenever the ith agent is risk averse (κ i > 0). Regarding the second item above (how the agents interpret their own actions on the market), the answer depends on the modeling choice. We shall focus on two of such choices, and model the actions in the market either via GNEP or via MCP approaches.
Consider, for the moment, a fixed realization ω ∈ Ω . -When modeling the equilibrium as a GNEP, each agent in the market minimizes cost, i.e., tries to solve the problem
1-realization for ith agent in GNEP model
Finding a variational equilibrium corresponds to the additional requirement that, in the problems above, the optimal Lagrange multipliers associated to the coupling constraints are the same for all the players, sayπ(ω). Such an equilibrium is desirable, as it has the economic interpretation of being fair -at an equilibrium all the agents are remunerated at the same price. -Alternatively, when modeling the equilibrium as a MCP, each agent maximizes the remuneration, i.e., solves 1-realization for ith agent in MCP
and the actions of all the agents are coupled by the constraint set S defined in (4), together with the complementarity condition between each constraint in S and π(ω), a.e. ω ∈ Ω . Note that the coupling constraints do not enter the agents' optimization problems. For the risk-averse variant of the game, let R i be a risk measure (in our computational developments, it will be a smoothed version of (5), aiming to approximate a solution of the problem associated to (5)).
In the case of GNEP, consider Stochastic GNEP:
and, a.e. ω ∈ Ω :
The triple (z ,q ,π), whereπ is the multiplier associated to the last constraint above (the same for all the players), is a variational equilibrium of the game. For the risk-averse complementarity equilibrium, we consider the model
together with 0
In Section 3, both models (6) and (7) of equilibrium with risk aversion will be cast as stochastic VIs.
Remark 1 (Price cap, regulatory interventions, and market power)
In energy markets there is often a higher entity, for example a regulating agency representing the consumers. This entity can be seen as an agent who acts on the market by capping prices, or by forcing demand satisfaction or environmental constraints. As shown in [28] for both the GNEP and MCP models, it is possible to incorporate an additional player, say the 0th agent, to represent such a regulator. For example, in the presence of a price cap PC ∈ L p * (Ω , F, P; R m 0 ), the variable q 0 (ω) represents a demand deficit while c 0 ω (q 0 (ω),q 0 (ω), ω) = PC(ω), q 0 (ω) measures the impact that capping prices has on the market when the realization of uncertainty is given by ω.
Both our models can also incorporate market power. Following [17] , when a pricesensitive demand curve is available, there are given intercept d 0 and matrix P defining the inverse demand function as P · +d 0 . In this case, for the MCP model the remuneration changes from π(ω),
for a factor δ i ∈ [0, 1] representing the strength of the agent in the market. For the GNEP, it is shown in [28] that modelling market power is equivalent to having an additional player that tries to maximize the revenue resulting from the product that is not afected by the market power of the agents, at the price given by the inverse demand function.
Remark 2 (Risk-neutral versus risk-averse in the MCP model)
It is easy to see that when in problem (7) there are no "here-and-now" variables z, the solution does not depend on the risk measure R i . In particular, there is no difference between the risk-neutral and risk-averse settings. This is because variables for different scenarios are coupled only by the risk measure, which is a monotone function. As a consequence, for any monotone R i , the solution in (7) is the same; in particular, it is equal to the solution obtained by solving (7) independently for each scenario.
On the other hand, in the presence of "here-and-now" variables z, the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases are no longer equivalent, as shown by the following simple example.
Consider a problem with one player, two scenarios, and all variables scalar. Let I(z) = 2z, let q 1 , q 2 be the "wait-and-see" variables, and let (7) be
where α 1 = 1, α 2 = 3. It can be seen that the risk-neutral approach gives the solution (z, q 1 , q 2 ) = (1, 1, 1), while the risk-averse approach with R = τ AVaR and τ = 0.1 gives (z, q 1 , q 2 ) = (1.394, 1, 1.394).
Solution Method
We now turn our attention to the issue of finding solutions to the equilibrium models (6) and (7) . As standard, we assume that all the investment and production functions are convex, and recall that the coupling constraint in S is affine. In both models and for each player i = 1, . . . , N, we take endogenous sets of polyhedral form:
where the matrices and vectors are of some appropriate dimensions. The two-stage formulation of the ith player's problem is given by
where the second-stage value functions are defined over R n i × Ω , as follows. For the GNEP model, they are given by
The MCP model has second-stage value functions given by
Recall that in the MCP model the complementarity condition associated to the coupling set S is imposed separately from the optimization problems.
We assume that for (9), (10) and (9), (11) the first-stage objective function is finitevalued for all feasible z i . In particular, recourse is relatively complete (the second-stage optimization problems have nonempty feasible sets for all feasible z i a.e. ω ∈ Ω ) and the minimum is attained.
In order to find solutions to the (possibly infinite-dimensional) problems above, rather than making the assumption of a finite set Ω , we adopt an approach based on random samples, in the spirit of the Path-Sample solution method [18] and the Sample Average Approximation [7, Ch. 5] . Accordingly, a random sample
of independent realizations of the random elements ω is generated. The probability distribution P is replaced by the distribution P K , which assigns the same probability (1/K) to all realizations (the sample is independently identically distributed).
The K-dimensional counterparts of the game and complementarity models result from (9) and either (10) or (11), recalling that now the second-stage value functions are defined over the finite set Ω K . For notational convenience, we replace therein all the appearances of (ω) with ω ∈ Ω K by a subindex k ranging from 1 to K: for example, G(z, ω) and q(ω) become G k (z) and q k . Also, in this discrete setting, instead of having L p -elements we deal with concatenation of objects with K-components, for instance
We start by characterizing solutions of a generic two-stage problem, which will be then used for both the GNEP and MCP formulations. Recall that the latter differs in the objective function and in the constraints of the second-stage problem, see (10) and (11) .
Proposition 1 Consider an abstract two-stage problem of the form
where G K is a vector-valued function with components
Assume that:
(i) the function R is proper, convex, lower semicontinuous, and increasing; (ii) the functions ϕ : R n → R, f k : R m → R and H k : R m → R l are differentiable and convex; (iii) for the given d × n and d × m matrices A k , B k and vectors b k ∈ R d the sets
. . , K; and (13) are solvable; (iv) some appropriate constraint qualification condition holds in (13) 
where A K is a K × n matrix with columns A k d k .
Proof Letȳ k be a solution in problem (13) for x =x. Then under the assumed constraint qualification it holds that
In particular,
Furthermore, under our assumptions,x solves (12) if and only if
where the kth column µ k of the matrix 
In particular, we can take y k (x) =ȳ k as above,
Collecting now all the relations established above shows that ( p, d K ,λ K ) solves the VI (F,C) stated in the assertion.
Before applying Proposition 1 to the game and complementarity models, we point out that the risk measure R appears only in the x-components of the VI operator, that is, in
Thus, when we shall replace the nonsmooth risk measures by their smoothed approximations in Section 4 below, only the components of the VI operator that correspond to (14) will be affected.
Variational Formulation of the Stochastic GNEP Model
Under our assumptions, the problems (9)-(10) are convex, their first-order optimality conditions are necessary and sufficient, and Proposition 1 applies. Specifically, for the ith player the relation with the notation used in the abstract two-stage problem (12)- (13) is
Note that optimization in the ith problem (6) is in the (primal) variables (z i , q i K ), but the objective function depends also on other players' variables (z −i ,q
, with λ i K corresponding to the coupling constraint linking the players' actions. Thus, for each player, we obtain an operator
of the structure specified in Proposition 1, with the objects as identified above for this GNEP setting. Considering all the N optimization problems, the desired variational equilibrium is obtained if we require that the multipliers λ i K be the same for all i = 1, . . . , N. Denoting the common multiplier by π K , we obtain a VI in the variables
with its operator and feasible set given, respectively, by
Note that for each i the term (14) of F i that involves the risk measure has the form
where the matrices A i K have K columns of the form Z i
is the z-component of the element normal to the endogenous polyhedrons X i k from (8), written with ω = ω k .
Variational Formulation of the Stochastic MCP Model
Once again, problems (9), (11) are convex, and Proposition 1 applies. For the complementarity model, using the second-stage value functions (11) we have the relations
and
because in (11) the coupling constraint does not appear in the players' optimization problems. In this model, the multiplier π k that enters the objective function f k in (11) is given by the complementarity condition (the last line in (7)) which is set outside the players' problems. Thus, within the setting of Proposition 1, π k plays a role of a parameter. Formally setting H k ≡ 0 in Proposition 1, the "lower" block of VI (F,C) holds automatically, and also the term with the multiplier λ k disappears from the second block of F. In particular, we obtain for each player a reduced VI with the operator
obtained from the one of the form specified in Proposition 1 by setting λ k = 0, removing the lower component that involves H k , and temporarily considering π k as a parameter.
In this model, we still need to add the coupling constraint and the complementarity relation with π k . This results in the VI ( F,C) in the same primal-dual variables and with the same feasible set C as in the GNEP model above (see (16) ), and with the operator
Finally, note that the part (14) of F i that involves the risk measure has the form
where the matrices A i K are as in the GNEP formulation.
A Convergent Approximation Scheme
When the agents hedge risk in their individual problems with nonsmooth measures ρ i , such as AVaR , the mapping in the corresponding variational inequality has set-valued components. As there currently appears to be no established software to handle such problems, the corresponding formulation is basically intractable. In [12] , a stochastic VI akin to our MCP model (12), (11) ignores the nondifferentiability issues and tries to solve the problem as if it were single-valued. This heuristic approach actually seems to produce sound results for the considered example, but naturally cannot be regarded as a reliable solution method in general.
To overcome the difficulty presented by the set-valued VI operators, we define a sequence of approximating problems that employ smooth risk measures R i = ρ i τ where τ > 0 is a parameter. The corresponding VIs are smooth single-valued, and can be tackled using the popular PATH solver [8, 15] . We show that as the smoothing parameter τ tends to zero, the corresponding solutions of smooth VIs asymptotically approach solutions of the original problems, i.e., those with the nonsmooth risk measures R i = ρ i .
Smoothing techniques are common in optimization and complementarity. In the stochastic setting those ideas have been used, for example, in [31] to smooth risk constraints and in [27] to handle stochastic optimization problems with equilibrium constraints. In a VI setting, smoothing has been used in [3] .
Smoothed Risk Measures: Definitions and Properties
We start with recalling the main elements of the general smoothing framework of [2] ; see also [14, Then, for τ > 0, the approximating function σ τ : R → R is given by
This function is well defined and it is convex, because d is nonnegative (σ τ becomes strictly convex when d is positive). Table 1 gives some examples of smoothing functions, their generators d, and the constants
useful to bound the closeness of σ τ to the positive-part function.
0 -the function σ τ is nondecreasing, convex, and continuously differentiable (if d is k-times continuously differentiable, then σ τ is (k + 2)-times continuously differentiable); -for every x ∈ R it holds that
To define a sequence of smooth risk measures, we smooth the positive-part function in the definition of AVaR. We next derive some useful properties of the resulting smooth risk measures. In particular, the fact that the smoothed risk measures converge continuously to AVaR is crucial for justifying our approximation approach.
Theorem 1 (Properties of the smoothed AVaR)
Given a function σ τ (·) as in (20) consider the function
defined for Y ∈ L 1 := L 1 (Ω , F, P; R). Then the following hold:
(i) The function τ AVaR ε is well defined: for all Y ∈ L 1 there exists u τ (Y ) (the "smoothed value-at-risk") realizing the minimum in (22) .
(iii) The function τ AVaR ε is convex and differentiable, with the derivative given by
(iv) The function τ AVaR ε is translation equi-variant and monotone:
for all a ∈ R and Y (ω) ≥ Y (ω) a.e. ω ∈ Ω , respectively. In particular, τ AVaR ε is a risk measure. (v) The family of functions τ AVaR ε converges continuously to the risk measure AVaR ε as τ tends to zero, i.e., whenever a sequence {y τ } converges to y as τ → 0, the sequence { τ AVaR ε (y τ )} converges to AVaR ε (y).
Proof Given Y ∈ L 1 , note that the AVaR-minimand T := u+
As a result,
So the τ AVaR -minimand is coercive too, and there exists u τ (Y ) realizing the minimum in (22), as claimed. Taking the infimum values over u in the chain of inequalities (23) gives
which further implies the second item of the assertions. Convexity of the function τ AVaR ε is direct from its definition as a marginal function:
where g is convex and differentiable on R × L 1 . Therefore,
and the third item of the assertions follows. The assertions of translation equi-variance and monotonicity are straightforward. This, together with convexity, implies that { τ AVaR ε } are risk measures [7, Chapter 6.3] .
Finally, by the second item in the assertions, the sequence { τ AVaR ε } converges uniformly to AVaR ε . Since the limit function AVaR ε is itself a continuous function, [40, Thm. 5.43] implies the the convergence is in fact continuous.
Remark 3 (Approximating functions as risk measures and coherence)
As established in Theorem 1(iv), the smooth functions τ AVaR ε are risk measures. For the risk measure to be coherent, it remains for τ AVaR ε to be positively homogeneous. Since the smoothing σ τ does not satisfy this property in general (c.f. Table 1 ), each individual function in the family of smoothed risk measures is not coherent. Nevertheless, all the smoothing functions in Table 1 satisfy for t > 0 and x ∈ R the relation σ τ (tx) = tσ τ/t (x) .
As a result, it holds that
This property shows that in some loose sense, ρ τ satisfies the coherence axiom in the limit, i.e., if the whole family of smoothed risk measures {ρ τ } τ is considered as τ → 0. Although not directly related with our smoothed τ AVaR functions, we mention the threshold risk measures from [4] , which employ a relation like (24) as a substitute for coherence.
Finally, we show that for both the GNEP model based on (9), (10) and the MCP model based on (9), (11) , accumulation points of solutions of the VIs with smoothed risk measures solve the original VI formulations (with nonsmooth measures). We remark that this result is more subtle than it might seem at first glance, as the proof depends not merely on convergence of the risk measures but also on the specific structures of the VI operators at hand.
Theorem 2 (Convergence of solutions of smoothed VIs)
Let the set C be given by (16) , and let for all τ > 0 the (single-valued) operators F τ be defined either by (15) or (18), with the risk measure R i (·) therein being
Then, as τ → 0, every accumulation point of any sequence of solutions of VIs (F τ ,C) solves the VI (F,C) , where the set C is given by (16) , and the (set-valued) operators F are defined consistently with F τ (by (15) or (18)), with the risk measure R i (·) being
Proof Denote u = (p, d). We first show that if {u j } →ū and τ j → 0, then for every accumulation pointv of {F τ j (u j )} it holds thatv ∈ F(ū). All the components of F τ j that do not depend on τ are continuous, and for those the conclusion is obvious. At issue is the second term of (17) for the GNEP model, and of (19) for the MCP model. In the current (smoothed) setting, the terms in question are of the form
where the functions ψ i τ are different for (17) and (19) , but in both cases they are convex with respect to q i and converge continuously to the corresponding limits ψ i as τ j → 0, due to the continuous convergence of { τ AVaR} to AVaR, shown in Theorem 1(v). We are in the situation where {q j } →q, w i j = ∇ q i ψ i τ j (q j ) for each j, and have to show thatw i ∈ ∂ q i ψ i (q) if w i j →w i as j → ∞ (perhaps on a subsequence). As ψ i τ j is convex with respect to q i , fixing an arbitrary q i it holds that
Passing onto the limit as j → ∞ and taking into account the continuous convergence of ψ i τ to ψ i , we obtain that
As q i was arbitrary, this shows thatw i ∈ ∂ q i ψ i (q), as required.
We have thus established that if {u j } →ū and v j = F τ j (u j ) for all j and τ j → 0, then for every accumulation pointv of {v j } it holds thatv ∈ F(ū).
Let nowū be an accumulation point of the sequence {u j } of solutions of VI (F τ j ,C), and let {u j l } →ū as l → ∞. It is clear thatū ∈ C and that the sequence {F τ j l (u j l )} is bounded. Let u ∈ C be arbitrary. It holds that
Passing onto the limit, we obtain that {v j l } →v (perhaps taking a further subsequence, if necessary) andv ∈ F(ū),
where u ∈ C is arbitrary andū ∈ C. This means thatū solves VI (F,C), as claimed.
It is shown in [19, Proposition 2] that continuous convergence of a family of convex smooth functions to a convex smooth function is equivalent to continuous convergence of their gradients. For the case when the limit function is nonsmooth, Theorem 2 uses the property of continuous convergence of the smoothed risk measures to show that the gradients converge to a specific subgradient.
Remark 4 (Closeness to the limit problem)
The K-dimensional counterpart of any of our equilibrium models (6), (7) is random because it depends on the sample Ω K . The adopted approach is useful when the sampling space is infinite, or has a huge cardinality. This is often the case in practice, because only a large number of realizations may capture all the ingredients in the uncertainty. It is then of interest to determine to which extent the discrete K-solutions approximate the solutions of the true problem, defined over Ω .
The work [19] gives general conditions for approximating Nash problems (without coupling constraints, but possibly nonconvex); see also [23] . For a stochastic VI with probability space Ω the path-sample approximation [18] considers, at iteration K, a VI defined over Ω K . The quality of the approximations is analyzed by bounding the distance of the approximate solutions to solutions of the limit problem. The work [18] considers a static VI with expected-value mapping, which amounts in our problem to have only "wait-and-see" variables and a risk-neutral setting.
The limiting properties of the sample-average-approximation for risk-neutral multi-stage optimization problems is considered in [7, Chap. 5] . It is known that the expectation of the optimal values of the players' problem taken over Ω K is smaller than the optimal value of the true problems, defined over Ω . Basically, by solving several K-dimensional counterparts of the multi-stage optimization problems generated on independently generated samples, it is possible to estimate a confidence interval for the optimal values and establish (exponential) rates of convergence to the "true" solutions. In [41] a more general setting, involving certain stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (the associated variational inequality has risk-neutral mappings and deterministic feasible set), is considered. Under certain assumptions, corresponding to the second-stage problems (13) having unique solutions for all k, the almost sure convergence of optimal values and optimal solutions is established, as well as the uniform exponential convergence of the K-problems. The analysis applies to the two-stage risk-averse players' problems in (6) or (7), since risk-measures still involve the calculation of some expectation, possibly including more variables (as in AVaR).
For numerical implementation with PATH, there is still one not-so-trivial analytical issue of determining what is the derivative (the Jacobian) of the smoothed VI operator. We address this next for the case when the smoothing function is strictly convex (e.g., the square-root smoothing, the second option in Table 1 ).
Smoothed VI Operator: Computing the Jacobian
The solver PATH, being a Newtonian method, requires the Jacobian of the VI operator. In our setting this means computing the derivative of
In view of the smoothed risk measure definition (22) , this calculation involves computing the second derivative of a marginal function v(y) = min u g(y, u) at a givenȳ ∈ R K , where
Given a minimizer u(ȳ) corresponding to v(ȳ) = g(ȳ, u(ȳ)), it holds that
By the convexity of σ τ ,
As
∂ u 2 (ȳ, u(ȳ)) > 0 for a strictly convex choice of σ τ , by the Implicit Function Theorem there exist neighborhoods Y ofȳ and U of u(ȳ) and a differentiable function u : Y → U such that, among other properties, for all y ∈ Y it holds that
By the convexity of g(y, ·), we have that v(y) = g(y, u(y)); v is differentiable and
This shows that v is twice differentiable. Differentiating (25) we obtain
implying the explicit formula for ∇u(y) as
∂ u 2 (y, u(y)) > 0 on the relevant neighborhood. Substituting the expression for ∇u(y) into
we obtain the needed formula.
In our specific case and because p k = 1/K, we have that
This yields
which coincides with the gradient expression in Theorem 1(iii). As for the second derivatives, we obtain the expression
, where we use the Kronecker notation δ i j = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise.
Assessment on the European Natural Gas Network
We apply our solution method to a part of the network of gas stated in [17] , with agents of several types: producers, traders, liquefiers, re-gasifiers, storage and pipeline operators. This is an energy-only market (there is no capacity market; so the investment variables and the corresponding objects disappear from the general model described above). Consumers are represented by the inverse demand function, a modelling referred to as "implicit" in [28] ; see also Remark 1. As there are no "here-and-now" variables, the risk-neutral and risk-averse MCP models are equivalent in this case (see Remark 2) . For this reason, our numerical results concern the GNEP model only.
Information about Solvers, Problem and Data
The GNEP stochastic model was coded in Matlab (R2012a), using PATH [8, 15] to solve the variational problems with stopping tolerance set to 0.01. The runs were performed on a PC operating under Ubuntu 12.04 LTS with Intel Core i7-2600 3.40GHz × 8 processors and 15GB of memory. The unconstrained problems to compute the τ AVaR values are solved using the package minFunc by M. Schmidt, see www.di.ens.fr/~mschmidt/Software/ minFunc.html.
For our runs we use data of a "subnetwork" in [17] , with 3 producers (Russia, the Netherlands and Norway), 1 trader, 1 regasifier, 1 liquefier, and 1 storage operator (the Netherlands, Belgium, Nigeria, and France, respectively), and the pipelines linking the agents. The deterministic version of the model has 44 variables and 22 constraints. Stochastic data was created by simulating random reductions in the deterministic values of the intercept of the inverse demand function, sampling from a uniform distribution and multiplying by a factor representing volatility. The left and right graphs in Figure 1 show 4 scenarios of the inverse demand function for France, for higher and lower volatility, respectively. In the figures, the deterministic function is plotted with circles. To assess the importance of volatility, in all of our tests below we consider two different (stochastic) situations, represented by the left and right plots in Figure 1 .
Throughout, unless stated otherwise, we used the square-root smoothing (the second option for σ τ in Table 1 ) with parameter τ = 0.1. For the risk measures we take ε = 0.1, and κ i = 0.1 for all the agents, except the producers, for which we let κ i = 0.75 (it is generally considered natural that producers are more risk averse).
Impact of the Sample Size and Smoothing Parameter
In order to determine what is a reasonable size for the sample Ω K , we solved the GNEP model for an increasing number of scenarios. Specifically, we let |Ω K | ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64} and made 5 runs for every cardinality, sampling different K scenarios for each. Table 2 reports the solution time in seconds (averaging over the 5 runs) for the risk neutral (RN), and the risk-averse game (RA) models. A suffix lo or hi refers to the data with low or high volatility represented by Figure 1 . All of the runs were successful (no failures). Naturally, for all the instances the risk-neutral model (κ i = 0 in (5)) is solved in less than one second. The interest of running both models with just one scenario (|Ω K | = 1) is to check if all the models give the same solution. This was the case for all of our runs. The increased CPU time for the risk-averse model when |Ω K | = 1 can be seen as the price to pay for the nonlinearities introduced by the risk measure. Regarding the two instances with less or more volatility, it appears as if the low volatility data made the VI more difficult to solve: with 8 and 16 scenarios it took PATH twice the time for RN lo compared to RN hi . We observed this phenomenon in all of our runs. We conjecture that when uncertainty is more "alike" (as in Figure 1 for the right graph, with low volatility), there are more "similar" feasible points, which can be interpreted as kind of degeneracy that might give Newtonian solvers like PATH some problems.
To compare the quality of the output, we compute the profit of the producers, averaged over 5 runs. Figure 2 shows the profit for each scenario, with and without risk aversion, and for the two instances of volatility for a problem with |Ω K | = 16.
We observe that the risk-neutral profit is more or less the same for each scenario in both graphs. By contrast, the risk-averse profit is very sensitive to different scenarios. This is shown by the RA values for scenarios 1 and 11 which represent, respectively, a very favourable and unfavourable situation. This behaviour is more extreme for the instance with high volatility: the producers incur losses for scenarios 6, 7, and 11, compensated by the very high gain in scenario 1. Table 3 reports more detailed statistics on the profit (mean and 90%-quantile), exhibiting a pattern similar to the one observed in Figure 2 (note in particular the spread between the mean and the quantile for RN hi ). For the same subnetwork, we vary the smoothing parameter. In particular, we use τ = 10 for ∈ {0, −1, −2, −3, −4}. In Table 4 we report the profit statistics for the producers, for both instances of volatility, running each problem 5 times, with |Ω K | = 10 scenarios. From the table, we conclude that the extreme values of parameters are likely the worse, especially for the high volatility case. Taking a smoothing parameter ranging between 0.1 and 0.01 seems the best choice, at least with the tested configuration. In all of our runs, unless stated otherwise, we used τ = 0.1.
Impact of Risk Aversion
For |Ω K | = 8 scenarios and 5 different runs each time, we solved the GNEP problems resulting from varying the aversion to risk of the producers in the range κ = {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. Table 5 reports the corresponding CPU time, averaged over the 5 runs. Since the risk-neutral models were once again solved in less than 2 seconds, we omit the corresponding figures in the table. Like observed in Table 2 , the low volatility problems are harder to solve. Also, it takes longer for PATH to solve problems with higher risk-aversion parameters (perhaps because producers exhibiting risk aversion make it more difficult for the market to be at equilibrium).
The statistics for the profit as producers become more risk averse are reported in Table 6 . By comparing the values with κ ≤ 0.75, it appears that increasing the aversion to risk is beneficial for the producer (even more so in the high volatility setting). However, becoming completely risk averse may not pay off: the values with κ ≤ 0.75 are preferable for the producer compared to those obtained setting κ = 1. A closer inspection of the output shows that when κ = 1, the high volatility problem results in an equilibrium such that all of the profit quantiles give losses to the producers, until the 8th one. But since there is one scenario (number 1) that is highly favourable, the corresponding gain pulls up the 9th quantile.
The Benefits of Decomposing
Since the (compiled) mex-file of PATH limits the size of solvable VIs using Matlab, for larger instances it would inevitably become necessary to apply some type of decomposition. In our case, one useful tool is the Dantzig-Wolfe VI decomposition [29] ; see also [16] . In particular, [29] presents a rather broad and flexible framework, allowing for various kinds of data approximations, inexact solution of subproblems, and a potential for parallelization; all useful for the model at hand.
Since we are dealing with a problem without (investment) first-stage variables, in the feasible set (16) the dimensions n i disappear and it becomes separable by scenarios (k = 1, . . . , K). In the VI-operator (15), on the other hand, all its components are separable by scenarios, except for the first block (17) . After smoothing, this block has the form Recalling the gradient expression in Theorem 1(iii), the coupling becomes clear, since where U i q K is the "smoothed value-at-risk". In order to induce separability along scenarios, we use the VI operator approximation called in [29] constant approximation. Specifically, at each iteration for each fixed scenario, we replace the term γ iR in the VI operator by the vector with all the terms fixed to the last available value. With such an approximation and for our data, the subproblems in the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition scheme of [29] become quadratic programming problems; they are solved by Mosek solver www.mosek.org. The master problems of [29] have a simplicial feasible set and a differentiable VI operator that involves the derivatives of the smoothed risk measures; the master problems are solved by PATH. For more details on this class of decomposition methods and its convergence properties, see [29] . Figure 4 shows the CPU times in seconds required by the direct solution of the problem by PATH and by using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition (stopped when the associated gap measure becomes smaller than 0.05 √ dim, with dim the dimension of the VI variables). We considered an instance of high volatility with 4 scenarios, and run the solvers 5 times. We observe that, except for one run (number 3, for which we have no explanation), the decomposition approach found an equilibrium (the same as PATH) in about 1/3 of the time required by applying PATH directly to the VI. Moreover, since various specific schemes within the Dantzig-Wolfe class of [29] can be parallelized (in particular, the one used in our implementation here), additional speedup is to be gained with a professional implementation. 
